Brexit will not only affect the trade relations between the uk and the eu but also vast areas of criminal law and procedure influenced and largely formed by eu law. This is especially true in the area of police and judicial cooperation -take for example the European Arrest Warrant -where the uk has always actively participated in the drafting and implementation of the relevant legal instruments and the actual cooperation. The paper will inquire how Brexit will affect the future relationship between the uk and the eu in these areas.
but not least, sketch out possible options of the uk's post-Brexit relationship with the eu in the criminal justice area (3).
The piece is dedicated to Wolfgang Schomburg who did not only have a formative influence of the case law of the icty where he served as the first German judge from November 2001 to November 2008 but also edited the perhaps most important German commentary on mutual assistance in criminal matters.4 In this commentary, European Criminal Law plays a prominent role. In addition, Schomburg was appointed honorary professor in Durham Law School, uk, in March 2009. For both reasons I am confident that this paper will find his interest.
eu Criminal Law and Justice (European Criminal Law in the Narrow Sense)
Taken at face value, the term 'European criminal law' refers to a genuinely supranational criminal law, that is, to provisions by which the citizens of the Union are directly confronted with the sovereign punitive force -the ius puniendi -of the Union as immediately applicable criminal law. However, genuine criminal law legislation by the Union is restricted to a few explicitly defined areas -above all, the protection of the Union's financial interests.5 Only to this extent is it possible to speak of European criminal law in a true, supranational sense, and, arguably, of a European criminal law or justice system in a narrow sense, that is, a limited subject matter area where the Union itself is the sole creator of criminal law norms (albeit depending on the Member States with regard to their enforcement).6 Otherwise, 'European Criminal Law' is a kind of umbrella term covering 'all those norms and practices of criminal and criminal procedural law' based on the law and activities of the eu (European law in the narrower sense) and the Council of Europe (European law in the wider sense), leading (or aiming to lead) to widespread harmonisation7 of national criminal (procedural) law.8 While Brexit refers to the Union, having a supranational nature, there are no signs that the uk wants to leave the Council of Europe, a regional organisation of 47 States,9 although there has been quite severe criticism against the Council's human rights system -part of the uk's domestic law by way of the 1998 Human Rights Act10 -and against the uk-related case law of the European Court of Human Rights.11 At any rate, this is not (yet) relevant in the Brexit context. The Union's authority to legislate criminal law has to flow from its primary law, that is, the Lisbon Treaty (principle of conferral).12 The respective authorisation has to be explicit or at least possible to establish -with reasonable certainty -through interpretation. In this regard, Art. 5(2) teu, replacing 8 In While European criminal law in the narrow sense is no comprehensive, selfcontained European criminal law or justice system of its own,21 there is a system of sorts, that is, 'some sort' of an 'umbrella-like' system that 'connects' the specific areas (which we may call 'micro systems' , e.g. the harmonised criminal law, the mutual recognition instruments, the human rights system)22 and which may, on the operational level, be more aptly characterized as a 'Verbund' (compound network / aggregate association) of the different entities and organs in charge of the investigation and prosecution of transnational crimes.23 Insofar the European criminal justice institutions, especially Europol and Eurojust, play an increasingly important, albeit hidden and intransparent, role in the shaping of European criminal justice policy in practice.24 At any rate, no independent, new (supranational) European criminal law is created beyond the Union's (limited) competence in the area of financial crime; rather, as a rule, national criminal law (either existing laws or those yet to be created) is influenced by European law.
Strictly speaking, we are dealing with Europeanised criminal law, which is why any comparison with federal legislation such as that of the usa is necessarily flawed.25 Besides the (limited) supranational criminal law regarding the 21 For the relevant arguments against cf P Asp (n 6) 209-211. See e.g. see also Walker, glj, 17 (2016) 126 ('With its opt-outs from the Euro and Schengen, and also from some wider aspects of criminal justice and immigration policy under the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the uk was already a major beneficiary -probably the major beneficiary -of the eu's variable geometry even before it cut a new "customised membership" deal in February that would have allowed exemption even from the founding Treaty commitment to "ever closer Union."'). For a historical account cf House of Lords (n 52) 7-9.
Community (eec) in 1973 and put the new agreement to a referendum on 5 June 1975 where it was endorsed.55 Concerning the above mentioned Schengen acquis, the uk (and Ireland) negotiated special regimes: It opted out of the policies regarding visas, asylum, immigration and others related to the free movement of persons (Title iv of Part Three tec),56 including with regard to the measures necessary to progressively establish the internal market pursuant to Art. 14 tec.57 As to the Schengen acquis the uk (and Ireland) reserved the right to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to participate in certain measures.58 According to Art. 4 of Protocol 19 to the Lisbon Treaty the uk (and Ireland) 'may at any time request to take part in some or all provisions' with the (unanimous) approval of the Council; at the same time, they are entitled to opt out within three months.59
Under the Lisbon Treaty the uk negotiated, (again) together with Ireland, a separate Protocol (21),60 which gave it, on the one hand, the right to fully abstain from any future measures in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and, on the other hand, allowed it to selectively opt-in regarding individual measures.61 This, in fact, amounted to a reintroduction of the veto -actually abolished by the Lisbon qualified majority voting -through the backdoor. 55 Cf In addition, Protocol 3662 gave the uk -as the only Member State63 -a full opt-out option from all (135) police and criminal justice measures adopted under the pre-Lisbon 'third pillar' with effect from 1 December 2014,64 unless they have been amended ('lisbonised').65 As to the envisaged European Public Prosecutor Office (eppo), the uk already made clear at the outset that it will not participate in this project unless there is a national referendum in favour ('referendum lock').66 The uk would then have had the possibility of a subsequent selective opt-in.67 On 24 July 2013, the uk made use of the opt-out and the 135 acts ceased to apply to it on 1 December 2014.68 Nevertheless, the most relevant acts have still been applicable to the uk since, on the one hand, the opt-out does not apply to the amended ('Lisbonised') and the new (post-Lisbon) acts69 and, on the other hand, the uk opted back in into thirty-five ('magic') measures, including some of the most important ones for police and criminal justice cooperation,70 including the respective jurisdiction of the cjeu.71 Thus, in sum, the whole opt-out-opt-in-exercise turned out to be largely 'a purely paper one' and as 'gesture politics' with the practical consequences amounting to 'nil' ,72 although, of course, the uk's selective approach to a supranational legal system like the eu constitutes a challenge to the coherence of the whole system.73 The said 35 measures as such have been described as 'part of a very complex network of arrangements, agreements, understandings and controls' which could not be dismantled without affecting the structure as a whole and at the same time all individual measures.74 At any rate, the Government then committed to publish annual reports in the 'form of an updated document describing jha opt-in and Schengen opt-out decisions taken between 1 December 2009 and the present.'75 Similarly, the uk always struggled to accept the jurisdiction of the ecj (now cjeu). When, under the Amsterdam treaty, its jurisdiction was expanded to 70 The measures, in total 35, are listed in hm Government (n 68) at 8-12 (e.g. eaw, ecris, Europol, Eurojust, eso, Naples ii, jits, cooperation in international crimes via contact points, execution of orders regarding freezing property or evidence, mutual recognition of financial penalties, confiscation orders, criminal judgments entailing deprivation of liberty and supervision measures, exchange of information and intelligence, cooperation regarding asset recovery, Schengen, sis ii, Art. Cf J R Spencer Archbold Rev, issue 8 (2013) 9. In a similar vein Yvette Cooper, Shadow Home Secretary, commented on Cameron's claim to have 'clawed back 100 powers from Brussels': 'We have the power not to do a whole series of things we plan to carry on doing anyway, the power not to follow guidance we already follow, the power not to take action we already take, the power not to meet standards we already meet, the power not to do things that everyone else has already stopped doing and the power not to do a whole series of things we want to do anyway' . (Hansard, House of Commons, 7 April 2015, Column 363). 73
For a fundamental critique, especially with regard to the negative impact on rights protection, cf V Mitsilegas, (n 35) 49-50, 180-181, 266. 74
Cf House of Lords (n 52) 38 (quoting Lord Kirkhope). 75 House of Commons (n 59) 7.
the second and third pillar,76 the uk did not submit the declaration necessary77 to consent to this jurisdictional expansion.78 Under the Lisbon treaty, the uk first opted out of the cjeu's jurisdiction with regard to police and criminal justice measures but then joined again with regard to the above mentioned 35 measures.79 3 Post-Brexit Options
3.1
The Starting Point Given this anyway highly selective acceptance of eu criminal justice by the uk Brexit will only have limited consequences for the future cooperation between the Union of the 27 and the uk. In fact, the criminal justice measures which the uk decided to join (by an opt-in), in particular the 35 'magic' ones re-joined in July 2013, indicate where the uk's core interest in the criminal justice area lies. In terms of the negotiations, these measures constitute the starting point of the uk's negotiating position given that its continuing participation in these measures, one way or the other, 'will remain in the uk's national interest postBrexit' .80 Indeed, then Home Secretary Theresa made clear at the time that the uk pursues its core security interests with the opt-in into these measures since 'bilateral agreements would simply not work as effectively and our cooperation would suffer …'81 Later she insisted that these measures 'make a positive difference in fighting crime and preventing terrorism. measures were well rehearsed at the time, and the decision was subject to scrutiny by several parliamentary Committees.'83 The government is still of the view that criminal justice cooperation with the eu is of fundamental importance for the uk's overall security structure. The Secretary of State for Exiting the eu stressed that a strong cooperation in the criminal justice area should be one of the top overarching objectives in the negotiations.84 In a White Paper the cooperation in the fight against crime and terrorism is listed as one of the 12 principles guiding the exit negotiations.85 Similarly, in the House of Lords' view the uk 'benefits greatly from close and interdependent police and security cooperation with eu institutions and member states. '86 In her letter triggering Art. 50 teu pm May reaffirmed once more the uk's continuing interest -apart from close economic cooperation -in a bold security cooperation with the eu.87 As top priorities for uk law enforcement agencies in the future cooperation with the eu the just mentioned House of Lords' report lists Europol, Eurojust, sis ii, the European Arrest Warrant (eaw), the European Criminal Records Information System (ecris), the Prüm Decisions (cross border cooperation)88 and the Passenger Name Records (pnr)89 showing a clear preference for data-access and -sharing;90 the list largely corresponds to the 35 measures re-joined in July 2013. 91 The Government believes that it has a strong negotiating position, being 'uniquely placed to develop and sustain a mutually beneficial model of cooperation … from outside the Union' , to get 'the best deal … to cooperate in the fight against crime and terrorism' and to 'seek a strong and close future relationship with the eu, with a focus on operational and practical cross-border cooperation.'92 In fact, the uk is still participating in all the mentioned 35 measures93 and recently also opted in into the new 2016 Europol Regulation.94 Thus, it is clear that the question is not whether but how the uk could most effectively participate in eu criminal justice cooperation after having left the eu.
3.2
Possible Agreements As to possible treaty relations between the uk and the eu criminal justice area one may distinguish between the institutional level, represented especially by Europol and Eurojust, and secondary acts (mainly the previous framework decisions). Apart from that, the uk could also -following in particular the Swiss approach -autonomously adapt its national law to eu developments, thereby facilitating cooperation with eu Member States. New Forms of Cooperation One should also note that, given the uk's special status and importance in the Union's criminal justice and security architecture, some unprecedented 'alternative arrangements'112 may be possible. There is a mutual interest of both the eu and the uk to have the closest criminal justice cooperation possible since both sides benefit from this cooperation and the uk has certainly more to offer than just any third country.113 At any rate, it is difficult to conceive that negotiations on all these options can be finished within two years (as envisaged by Art. 50 teu).114 More importantly, even if the current situation would be fully replaced by new agreements or 'alternative arrangements' , cooperation would still not be the same as from within the eu. In other words, alternative approaches, as for example demonstrated by Switzerland,115 have their limits. As rightly argued by Mitsilegas none of the post-Brexit options will be 'capable of providing to the uk a level of co-operation which is equivalent to the current level of co-operation as a member of the eu …'116 In a similar vein, the already mentioned House of Commons report finds that 'it appears unlikely that any of these options would provide an equivalent level of co-operation as that currently enjoyed by the uk.'117 The House of Lords even sees 'a real risk that any new arrangements the Government and eu-27 put in place by way of replacement when the uk leaves the eu will be sub-optimal relative to present arrangements, leaving the people of the uk less safe.'118 would in fact be replaced or fall back to traditional mutual assistance. 119 As to Europol, the uk's status would depend on the nature of the agreement (only strategic or also operational);120 even in the latter case the uk would not have the same access to the Europol databases, would not sit on the agency's management board121 and could only send liaison officers to Europol Headquarters if agreed by the management board.122 The uk would also lose its seat in the recently created Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group overseeing Europol's work since it is composed of members of the national parliaments and the European Parliament.123 As to Eurojust, the uk would no longer participate in the On-Call Coordination124 and would not have access to its case management system enabling cross checking of cases.125 Also, it is not clear how an uk liaison prosecutor, pursuant to a bilateral agreement, would link up with Eurojust, especially whether s/he would be able to participate in transnational coordination in the same way as prosecutors from eu Member States. 126 In both cases, it would be difficult to get around the jurisdiction of the cjeu so disliked by the uk. 127 The continuing participation in jits could be ensured by a bilateral agreement128 or through participation in relevant multilateral treaties.129 An eaw-like surrender procedure would require, as already pointed out above, a Norway/Island-like agreement which in turn would require Schengen membership; otherwise, the uk would fall back on the burdensome 1957 Council of Europe Extradition Convention.130 Even if the uk reached a Norway/Island-like agreement, it would have to get rid of the nationality exception (contained therein in Article 6) which would be hard to swallow for some of the eu Member States which have, like Germany, a prohibition to extradite nationals. 131 Also, one must not overlook that any post-eu cooperation does notcontrary to the clearly expressed interest by the uk aiming at 'bespoke' adjudication arrangements132 -entail 'complete independence from eu law'133 since this law will still be applicable by way of the eu and its Member States (as the uk's partners). Thus, any agreement between the uk and the eu would have to be interpreted by the cjeu.134 While this interpretation would not be directly binding on the uk (being no longer an eu member), it would indirectly affect it via the respective agreement (as interpreted by the cjeu). Similarly, a dispute resolution mechanism would have to be established which may involve the cjeu (whose jurisdiction has never been fully embraced by the uk).135
Conclusion
The uk's special status vis-à-vis the eu criminal justice area and its great influence in shaping and developing this area136 may justify the Government's confidence in getting a special deal and achieving tailor made solutions which reconcile the uk's sovereignty and public security interests. Yet, the uk's selective approach to criminal justice, characterized by a mixture of opt-out, optin and neither/nor decisions, will make negotiations more complex than with a 'normal' Member State and may also generate resistance among certain Member States which never felt at ease with the uk's privileged treatment by the eu. At any rate, as we have seen, there are possible options on the table which may bring the uk as close as possible to the eu in terms of police and criminal justice cooperation if both parties have sufficient political will and are prepared to think out of the box taking recourse to unprecedented arrangements.
